Rauhan ajan vakoilulentokuvat luovutettiin saksalaisten käyttöön

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Bristol Blenheim - "lyhyt nokkainen"

Lainaus alkaa ---

Tekijä: Juhana Lepoluoto Julkaistu alun perin Keskisuomalainen-lehdessä 3.5.2002 Armas Eskolan vuonna 1939 ohjaamien kuvausretkien yksityiskohdat kerrotaan vasta nyt Avoimeksi jää vieläkin suuri kysymys: tiedettiinkö Neuvostoliitossa tiedusteluyhteistyöstä? Vapun aattona 1939, rauhan vielä vallitessa Euroopassa, Immolan lentotukikohdasta nousi kapteeni Armas Eskolan ohjaama kaksimoottorinen Bristol Blenheim -kone suorittamaan salaista tehtävää Neuvostoliiton ilmatilassa. Lentolaite oli samaa "lyhytnokkaista" tyyppiä, jollaisia Eskola oli kuskannut Englannin Filtonista Suomeen vuodesta 1936 lähtien. Eskolan yksityiskohtainen kertomus noista rauhan ajan tiedustelulennoista on julkaistu vasta nyt, Kavo Laurilan kokoamassa ja osin kirjoittamassa teoksessa Jatkosodan kaukopartiolennot (Koala Kustannus 2002). "Ensimmäinen lento suoritettiin todennäköisesti saksalaisten pyynnöstä", Eskola arveli. Hänen mukaansa yleisesikunnan käytössä oli myös saksalaisia asiantuntijoita, jotka opettivat suomalaisille stereokuvien tulkintaa. Palkkioksi suomalaiset näyttävät saaneen erilaisia tiedustelulaitteita, joihin kuului myös erinomaisia ilmakuvakameroita. Aiemmin käytössä olleet brittiläiset Eagle-kamerat olivat osoittautuneet varsinkin korkealla lennettäessä epävarmoiksi vempaimiksi. Talvisodan puhjettua monet sotilaat kuulivat rauhan ajan kuvauslennoista. Salaisuus nousi esille myös vajaat kolme vuotta sitten, kun sodanaikaista lentotiedustelua esitelleen näyttelyn koonnut eversti evp. Jyri Paulaharju kertoi siitä. Yhteistyö saksalaisten kanssa on kuitenkin pysynyt pimennossa näihin päiviin saakka. Kuperkeikkaa Aunuksen yllä Ensimmäinen lento suuntautui 7 300 metrin korkeudessa punalaivaston päätukikohdan Kronstadtin yli Viron rannikolle ja Leningradiin. Kamera raksutti kuvia pitkin matkaa ja vappukatselmuksiin valmistautuvan punalaivaston vanavedetkin piirtyivät filmille. Elokuuhun 1939 tiedustelulentoja oli tehty yli 20, joista 13 tuotti tulosta. Niiden kohteena olivat Laatokan itäpuoli lentokenttineen, Äänisjärven rantamat ja Petroskoin alue. Muuan näistä lennoista oli aiheuttanut jyrkän nootin, jossa vaadittiin BL-tunnuksella merkityn suomalaisen koneen miehistölle rangaistusta. Eskolan ironia kuuluu vielä selostuksessa, jossa hän sanoo, että syyllisten etsintä aloitettiin varmuuden vuoksi Kauhavalta, ja syntipukin jäljille päästiin vasta juuri ennen talvisotaa. Lentäjän happinaamarin letku oli irronnut huomaamatta, ja ohjaajalta katosi taju. Kone teki ihmeellisiä liikkeitä matalalla Aunuksen kaupungin yläpuolella. Ilmakuvaaja, ylikersantti Oinonen, ei päässyt konekivääritornin täyttäneen kuvauslaitteiston vuoksi käsiksi laskuvarjoonsa, joka tuntui ainoalta pelastukselta. Toisella kerralla oltiin ongelmissa Suomen puolella: kuvauskoneen moottori sammui viallisten venttiilijousien vuoksi, mutta rajavartioston hallinnoimalle Onttolan kentälle matalalla liidellyt lentäjä onnistui lauhduttamaan kiukkuisen, vastaanottamassa olleen everstin tunteet. Erkki Raappanalle kerrottiin, mistä oli kysymys. Kenraalikin etsi syyllistä Talvisodan toisena päivänä, 1.12.1939, ilmavoimien komentaja, kenraali J. F. Lundqvist saapui Tikkakosken Luonetjärvelle ja levitteli esikunnassa Eskolan sanoin "nähtäväksi mahdottoman määrän ottamiamme valokuvia". Samalla kenraali totesi, että salaisuuksien aika oli päättynyt. Vuoden 1941 alkupuolella Eskola kutsuttiin kuitenkin kuultavaksi. Samainen ilmavoimien komentaja oli määrännyt kirjelmällään aloitettavaksi tutkimukset valokuvauslentojen ilmitulosta. Eskola kertoo: "Kieltäydyin jyrkästi minkäänlaisista kuulusteluista". Jatkosodan päätyttyä anglofiilinä pidetystä Lundqvistista leivottiin puolustusvoimien komentaja. Presidentti Juho Kusti Paasikivi vapautti hänet kuitenkin tehtävistään, kun Lundqvist yritti tehdä liittoutuneiden valvontakomissiolle palveluksia, joita ei ollut edes pyydetty. Lundqvist halusi puhdistaa armeijan johdon pikavauhtia pakottamalla korkeita upseereja eroamaan. Lundqvistin jälkimaine jäi oudoksi, eikä kukaan ole pitänyt tuota entistä tykistöupseeria ainakaan ilmasodan asiantuntijana. Tiesivätkö venäläiset? Yhdysvaltain viestitiedustelulaitoksen NSA:n julkaisemissa avatuissa venäläistiedustelun viesteissä, niin sanotuissa Venonan papereissa, on Suomeakin koskevaa aineistoa. Viestien mukaan Neuvostoliitolla näyttää jatkosodan aikaan olleen tiedottajia korkeissa suomalaisissa hallitus- ja sotilaspiireissä. Juuri ennen talvisotaa venäläisten sotilastiedustelu oli sekasorrossa, kun sen luoja, Jan Berzin, oli menettänyt henkensä puhdistuksissa. Aiemmin Berzinin johtama laitos oli selvittänyt agenttinsa, valokuvaajaluutnantti Vilho Pentikäisen, avulla Viron ja Suomen salaisen sotilasyhteistyön Suomenlahden sulkemiseksi. Tiedetään, että suomalaisten Blenheim-ohjelma kiinnosti punatiedustelua erityisesti ja että nuo pommikoneet olivat sabotointikohteiden listalla. Voi kuitenkin olla aiheetonta epäillä, että Eskolan koneen venttiilijousien viallisuus olisi johtunut tihutyöstä. Mutta jos suuren vainoharhaisuuden ja tuholaisjahdin huumaama Josif Stalinin diktatuurihallinto oli saanut jostain - ja mahdollisesti korkeasta lähteestä - vihiä suomalaisista vakoilulennoista, tiedolla saattoi olla vaikutuksensa myöhempiin tapahtumiin. Tiedustelukuvausten lentäjä, everstiluutnantti evp. Armas Eskola, tapasi vielä elossa olevia kollegojaan Tikkakosken ilmailumuseossa vuonna 1989. Kuvauslentojen aikana Armas Eskola oli sotilasarvoltaan kapteeni. Tästä aiheesta käydään mielenkiintoista keskustelua Third Reich Forumilla, josta englanninkielistä keskustelua lainattu alle. Viestien pihviosuus lainattu alle: Did anyone saw article from Etelä-Suomen Sanomat 17.11 "Suomalaiset Leningradin taivaalla kesällä 1939" (Finns in the Leningrad sky in summer 1939). It tells about several (23 if I remember correct) missions where Bristol Blenheim plane with 3 crew members flew over and photographed Leningrad, Kronstadt, and southern beach of gulf of Finland. Germany used same region in their attack to Leningrad in 1941. Only few people knew about these missions and no one still knows who needed these pictures. Captain Armas Eskola who flew all 23 missions believes that Germany was behind it...-- This is the first time I have seen this information. Sounds a bit far fetched that RAF would have done photographing flights on German account in 1939. More plausible reason would be own security needs. The situation in Europe was already getting tense and photographic information, or spying if the planes flew over Soviet territory, could have revealed any troop concentrations on the Soviet side of the Finnish and Estonian borders. Strength and location of the Soviet Baltic Fleet would probably also have been of interest. If there was any co-operation with some other nation, I would guess it was Estonia. Especially given the recently published study on Finnish-Estonian co-operation in coastal defence. -- I have also red about these flights. They are well described in Laurila's book about Finnish long-range patrol pilots (published in 2002) and also in the book(s) of Joppe Karhunen. These stories are written/told by Capt. Eskola himself so they should be reliable. Eskola says that he saw German officials at Helsinki in the RAF Staff. Finns also received new Zeiss cameras from Germany for these missions, so it is more than likely that this photography operation was mutual Finnish-German one. Why these regions were photographed is another thing, but it is always good to know what is behind the frontier because situation was becoming "hotter" all the time... My theory is that photographing was done for the making of new better maps. On the other hand Soviet Union carried out similar kind of job in Finland and for sure elsewhere too. These flights were called "ghost flights" in Finland and happened before Winter War. For example Lt. T. Huhanantti was about to crash with an unknown plane near Utti air base in 1938 (or 39?). That plane flew with all lights off and Finnish pilots believed that it would have been in secret duties. But was it a Soviet one? The Commander of RAF ordered that Huhanantti should admit that he saw nothing. -- AFAIK Soviet "Ghost flights" over Finland were common in 1934 and also just before WWII. There was a big trial against Finnish helpers (beacon maintenance) of these flights and it seems that this trial proved that the Soviet flights really had occurred. However, I have only one source for this information: the book "Skuggan över Norden" by Valentin Sjöberg, that was written for political reasons, i.e. anti-bolsevism. Who knows of later and more objective sources? -- I don't think the fact that the cameras were manufactured by Zeiss is very relevant. Zeiss manufactured most if not of all cameras that Finns used for aerial photography. One type manufactured by Zeiss was designed by Nenonen's staff. Zeiss bought the patent. It is an other matter if German officers have been present. Still I don't really see what possible benefit Finns could have had from the business. Being caught on a mission does not sound worth the trouble if the only beneficiary was a third power. German-Finnish relations were not the best possible in 1938 or 1939 either. There must be something more to it than has been mentioned in the references quoted here. -- I don't think the fact that the cameras were manufactured by Zeiss is very relevant. Zeiss manufactured most if not of all cameras that Finns used for aerial photography. One type manufactured by Zeiss was designed by Nenonen's staff. Zeiss bought the patent. I thought Gen. Nenonen just invented the method of stereo photographing and Zeiss made the camera systems for that. I don't know any details so I may be wrong but this indicate that Finns and Germans co-operated in this sector already much before WW II. It is an other matter if German officers have been present. Still I don't really see what possible benefit Finns could have had from the business. Being caught on a mission does not sound worth the trouble if the only beneficiary was a third power. German-Finnish relations were not the best possible in 1938 or 1939 either. There must be something more to it than has been mentioned in the references quoted here. I didn't say "German officers" because officials Eskola met wore civil clothes but spoke German. It is also possible that these guys were not Germans. Of course we Finns get these photographs too. It seems that another country partisipated in these missions - perhaps financing them, supplying films and cameras etc. The primary reason for these flights was for sure mapping. Perhaps spying newest Soviet ships and aircraft (types and numbers) could be other reasons. I don't think military relationships would have been as bad as political relationships. You forget that Gen. Halder visited in Finland in the summer 1938 (IIRC). Many Finnish officers visited in Germany for example Capt. "Eka" Magnusson (later Commander of Flying Squadron 24) who got to know interesting things on German air defense in 1938. Heinkel He 112 "cannon fighter" was demonstrated at Utti after that visit, but was fortunately not bought (it was a "sheep in wolf's clothes" according to Suomen Ilmailuhistoriallinen Lehti / Finnish Aviation History Magazine). -- This is a very interesting post. Thank you for posting it on this forum. I would like to give some more fuel to this discussion by asking some further questions. I hope you don't mind me doing this. The questions are: a.) Did Finland have any naval intelligence surveillance stations along the Baltic Sea coastline and on the islands of Suursari, Seiskari and Lavansaari, from which it could easily monitoring the movements of the Soviet Baltic Fleet? I have read in some book some years ago that from the Finnish border town and famous sea resort before the war, TERIJOKI, today known as Zelenogorsk, you could very easily saw all the movements of the Soviet Baltic Fleet in Kronstadt and Sankt Petersburg?. b.) If these aerial reconnaissance flights really happen, how come the Soviets were not aware of them? I mean the fact that someone could made twenty-three air missions unharmed over Kronstadt and Sankt Petersburg, the second largest city in Soviet Union and the largest Soviet Naval Base in the Baltic, in such a tense time as it was 1939 is leaving me in some skepsis. Was either the Soviet air defense so badly manned and led or ..... Also, how come the Soviet spy, one Finnish officer in the Finnish headquarters did not introduce to the Soviets that such reconnaissance flights are being carried out over Soviet Union? Unless of course, if they were kept in absolute secrecy even in the Finnish Military Command. -- It would seem extremely risky to fly such missions over the very city whose security was used as the pretext for territorial demands on the Karelian Isthmus. If the Blenheim would have been shot down, it would have offered an immediate reason to attack, so the risks were politically high explosive. On the other hand, Blenheim was a comparatively fast aircraft compared to Soviet fighters at that time (Polikarpov I-16), and obviously the missions were flown in a very high altitude to avoid detection visually or by sound. Apparently the weather had to be bright for good photographic resolution. Air surveillance radar systems were not operative on the Soviet side then, so the Blenheim would have been revealed only with bad luck from an airborne Soviet fighter. The number of missions, 23, sounds high. Do the sources give the reason for this? Was it perhaps "basic research" to determine a reference point regarding normal peacetime military activity, to be compared with troop concentrations later? Are you quite sure about the name of the battleship above? My bet is it's the "Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya", or October Revolution. "Gangut" is an interesting story in itself. The Soviet / Russian naval history celebrates an unknown naval battle, "The Battle of Gangut", which few know about in the west. "Gangut" is actually the Russian way of pronouncing the Swedish "Hangö Udd", for "Hankoniemi" in Finnish. As far as I remember, The Imperial Russian Fleet had success in its waters against the Royal Swedish Navy sometimes in history. But I have not heard of "Gangut" given as a name to a warship. -- I thought Gen. Nenonen just invented the method of stereo photographing and Zeiss made the camera systems for that. I don't know any details so I may be wrong but this indicate that Finns and Germans co-operated in this sector already much before WW II. Nenonen did not invent the method but he and his staff improved it a lot increasing the efficiency by 20 times compared to what it was before. This led to a situation where the army was mapping Finland 5 to 10 times faster than the civilian authorities. Zeiss was not selected because it was a German company but because it was the best. And in some areas it still is. Some Japanese camera manufacturers still use lenses made by Zeiss because of their superior quality. So the fact that the equipment was "made in Germany" is not very significant. What comes to the visits of German officers in Finland that was the policy German government followed in Finland. The more the diplomatic relationships deteriorated the more German foreign office used the in-official channel that soldiers provided. Because of personal relationship between many Finnish and German officers it was relatively easy to get an invitation. German political goal was to prevent Finland becoming one of the Scandinavian neutrals. Those days both Germany and Russia allowed Finland only to choose side not to stay out. From Finnish point of view, the ministry of foreign affairs did not understand how the visits of German and western, especially British, military would be interpreted in Soviet Union. Obviously Berlin understood very well how the visits would be interpreted. Wipert von Blücher's (German ambassador in Finland) comments that have been quoted in many history books are very revealing. He clearly saw how the German influence in Finland deteriorated towards the end of the 1930's and he did his best to slow down the process. Using visits of the military was one of the ways he recommended. He also tried other measures, like inviting Finnish artists to visit Germany. Unfortunately Olavi Paavolainen's visit turned into a disaster from Blücher's point of view. As Blücher himself noted "ten years would not be enough to make good of the damage caused by Paavolainen's book" (Kolmannen valtakunnan vieraana, Guest of the Third Reich). Without more information I still find it hard to believe that FAF would have photographed Leningrad area on German account given the potential consequences of getting caught. I don't doubt that Abwehr could well have received copies of the photos through some deal. -- a.) Did Finland have any naval intelligence surveillance stations along the Baltic Sea coastline and on the islands of Suursari, Seiskari and Laavansaari, from which it could easily monitoring the movements of the Soviet Baltic Fleet? I have read in some book some years ago that from the Finnish border town and famous sea resort before the war, TERIJOKI, today known as Zelenogorsk, you could very easily saw all the movements of the Soviet Baltic Fleet in Kronstadt and Sankt Petersburg? Well, not officially, but we could watch over all movements of Soviet Baltic Fleet. That was the main reason we lost Karelian Isthmus, these islands and submarines were forbidden for the Finnish Navy. Finns together with Estonians had solved the encrypting code of Soviet Baltic Fleet and could read their messages, so there was no need for observing. All coastal batteries which could hit the sea routes to St. Petersburg and Kronstadt naval base were destroyed according to Tartu peace agreement in 1920. Also the islands of the Bay of Finland were unarmed. Terijoki [Zelenogorsk] was not a town. There were only three towns in ceded areas: Viipuri [Vyborg], Sortavala and Käkisalmi [Priozjorsk]. b.) If these aerial reconnaissance flights really happen, how come the Soviets were not aware of them? I mean the fact that someone could made twenty-three air missions unharmed over Kronstadt and Sant Petersburg, the second largest city in Soviet Union and the largest Soviet Naval Base in the Baltic, in such a tense time as it was 1939 is leaving me in some skepsis. Was either the Soviet air defense so badly manned and led or ..... Also, how come the Soviet spy, one Finnish officer in the Finnish headquarters did not introduce to the Soviets that such reconnaissance flights are being carried out over Soviet Union? Unless of course, if they were kept in absolute secrecy even in the Finnish Military Command. They just couldn't find/reach a fast flying single plane. The flying height was 6000 m which is quite high. Not all of these flights were directed to St. Petersburg. The whole coast from the border of Estonia, Karelian Isthmus and areas north from Lake Ladoga were photographed. And not all missions succeeded. IIRC at least once plane was about to crash when there was a failure in pilot's oxygen system. Plane crossed the border at low level and it was seen by Soviet soldiers. This occasion led to the exchange of notes between Finnish and Soviet border authorities. I'm not quite sure if there were Soviet spy(s) in Finnish General Staff, more likely they worked in the Ministry of Defense. As a matter of fact even the Commander of Air Defense Maj.Gen. Jarl Lundqvist didn't know about these missions initially. The order came from the General Staff. Perhaps our military authorities wanted to assure that there would have been no danger of amphibious assault against the southern coast of Finland. For us Soviet troop concentrations were of course vital information. --- lainaus päättyy.